Judge Resigns Over 913 Political Donations

Six Years on the Bench, 913 Checks

Diana Tennis did not arrive on the bench from a political career. She graduated with honors from the University of Florida College of Law in 1992, worked as an assistant public defender in Orlando, and then built a private practice in criminal defense and family law. She became a judge in 2015, served in Osceola County family court, moved to Orange County probate and guardianship in 2018, and in 2023 became the administrative circuit judge for family court in Orange County.

The numbers surfaced in charging documents the Judicial Qualifications Commission filed in September 2025. An analysis of federal campaign finance filings showed 913 individual political contributions totaling roughly $29,155 between January 2017 and January 2021, a stretch covering most of her first six years as a judge. Reporting on the case described her as the most prolific offender among the Florida judges investigated, in both the number of contributions and the dollar total.

Her explanation was not that she was unaware of the rule. It was that she thought it reached something narrower. Tennis said she believed the prohibition applied only to state-level candidates and races rather than federal ones, and that she had not realized some contributions had been set up as automatic recurring charges. In Florida, every candidate for judicial office signs a form attesting that they have received, read, and understand the Code of Judicial Conduct.

Tennis gave to candidates and committees on one side of the aisle. The rule she ran into does not care which party receives the money. A Florida judge who wrote 913 checks to the other party’s candidates would be in exactly the same position. The violation is a sitting judge participating financially in partisan campaigns at all.

The Deal the Supreme Court Refused

Tennis and the Commission negotiated a resolution: a public reprimand. That is where the case took its unusual turn. On June 25, 2026, the Florida Supreme Court entered an order rejecting the parties’ stipulation and disapproving the proposed sanction. The Court wrote that in addition to the public reprimand agreed to in the stipulation, it would impose a fine. It gave the parties 30 days to file a revised stipulation accepting a fine, or to report that they had not reached agreement, in which case the matter would return for a hearing before the Judicial Qualifications Commission. Chief Justice Muñiz and Justices Labarga, Couriel, Grosshans, Francis, and Sasso concurred. Justice Tanenbaum dissented.

When the parties reported that they could not agree on revised terms, the case was headed back to the Commission. Rather than continue, Tennis resigned effective September 4, 2026. She had not been seeking reelection, and her term was set to expire in January 2027. Her attorney, Warren Lindsey, defended her record, calling her an outstanding judge who served the Central Florida community with distinction and integrity. The practical result is that no sanction was ever imposed. Contemporary news coverage described the Court as signaling a suspension along with a fine; the order itself speaks only of a fine, so that is what this file relies on.

The Discipline Ladder (Florida)

Florida routes judicial misconduct through the Judicial Qualifications Commission, which investigates and charges, but the Commission does not impose discipline on its own. The Florida Supreme Court does. That structure is why this case ended the way it did: the judge and the Commission can agree on a sanction, and the Court can still refuse it as too soft and demand more. Texas works differently. The State Commission on Judicial Conduct issues sanctions directly, in ascending order of severity as admonitions, warnings, reprimands, and censures, either privately or publicly, with removal and suspension handled through a review tribunal.

The Rules at Issue

How It Works in Texas

Texas elects its judges in partisan elections. Judicial candidates run with a party label, raise campaign money, and appear on the ballot alongside every other partisan race. Texas Canon 5 restricts political activity, but not the way Florida’s Canon 7 does. Separately, the Election Code limits how a judicial candidate may use campaign funds, including a $100 annual cap on using political contributions to contribute to another candidate or officeholder. So a Texas judge writing personal checks to candidates is not doing the thing Florida flatly prohibits. If that same judge publicly endorsed another candidate, or allowed the judicial title to be used to do it, that is where Texas draws its line, and the State Commission on Judicial Conduct has issued a public statement saying exactly that.

In Texas the money does not mostly flow out from judges. It flows in, from the lawyers and litigants who then appear in front of the judge they helped elect. The Legislature has capped judicial campaign contributions through the Judicial Campaign Fairness Act, but the structural fact remains: the lawyer standing across from you may have written a check to the judge deciding your case, and in Texas that is legal. For a fuller walk-through of the Texas conduct process, see our explainer, The Texas State Commission on Judicial Conduct, Explained.

Texas Rule of Civil Procedure 18b, which criminal courts follow in practice through Article 30.01 of the Code of Criminal Procedure and related law, requires a judge to recuse when the judge’s impartiality might reasonably be questioned, when the judge has a personal bias concerning a party, or when the judge has personal knowledge of disputed evidentiary facts. Rule 18a sets the mechanics: the motion must be verified, filed as soon as practicable, and it cannot rest only on the judge’s rulings in the case. Adverse rulings alone are not bias.

Campaign money can, at an extreme, become a due process problem rather than merely an ethics question. In Caperton v. A.T. Massey Coal Co., 556 U.S. 868 (2009), the Supreme Court held that due process required a West Virginia justice to recuse where the chief executive of a party had spent roughly $3 million supporting his election while the case headed to that court. The test is objective: whether the influence created a serious risk of actual bias. The Court was clear that ordinary contributions in a normal judicial election do not violate due process, and Texas courts had consistently rejected contribution-based recusal claims before it. Caperton is the outer boundary, not an everyday tool. But the boundary exists. A recusal motion seeks relief in your case; a complaint to the State Commission on Judicial Conduct addresses the judge. They are separate tracks, and a defendant who needs relief in the case files the motion.

One more Texas development matters here. On November 4, 2025, Texas voters approved Proposition 12, a constitutional amendment out of Senate Joint Resolution 27. The 13-member State Commission on Judicial Conduct had consisted of six judges appointed by the Supreme Court of Texas, two attorneys appointed by the State Bar, and five citizens appointed by the Governor. Proposition 12 shifts it to a citizen majority, gives the Governor seven of the thirteen appointments, and eliminates the two State Bar seats. It also changes the review tribunal and expands sanction authority, including suspension without pay and, in some circumstances, barring a person from future judicial office. Supporters framed it as accountability; critics argued it hands the Governor control over the body that disciplines an elected judiciary. Both readings are live, and this file takes no position on which is right. What matters practically is that the Commission a Texas complaint reaches today is a different institution than it was two years ago, and its sanction powers are broader.

How It Played in the Press

The resignation was covered by WKMG in Orlando and aggregated widely the same day, with the Tampa Bay Times having carried the underlying ethics filings since September 2025. The detail that traveled furthest was the raw count, 913 contributions, alongside the characterization of Tennis as the most prolific offender among the Florida judges investigated. Coverage also placed the case in a run of Florida judicial discipline reaching the state supreme court, including a public reprimand in March 2026 for a Broward County circuit judge who acted as legal counsel for a friend during a hearing.

Where Things Stand Now

Tennis left the bench the day her resignation took effect, September 4, 2026, roughly four months before her term was set to expire. She was not a candidate for reelection. Because she resigned before the case concluded, no sanction was imposed, and the discipline matter ended without a final ruling on punishment. She remains a member of the Florida Bar so far as the public record reflects, and nothing indicates she has announced plans to return to the bench.

Sources

PRIMARY SOURCE

• Supreme Court of Florida, Inquiry Concerning a Judge, JQC Nos. 2024-714 and 2024-767 re: Diana M. Tennis, No. SC2025-1438, order of June 25, 2026 (rejecting the stipulation and disapproving the proposed sanction). assets.alm.com

NEWS COVERAGE

• WKMG ClickOrlando: Orange County judge resigns amid discipline case (September 3, 2026). clickorlando.com
• Hoodline: Orange County Judge Diana Tennis Resigns Rather Than Face Suspension Over Donations (September 4, 2026), citing WKMG and the Tampa Bay Times. hoodline.com

REFERENCE

• Texas Code of Judicial Conduct, Canons 2, 3, and 5. txcourts.gov
• Texas State Commission on Judicial Conduct, public statement on political endorsements by judges, PS-2000-2. scjc.texas.gov
• Texas Ethics Commission: Campaign Finance Guide for Judicial Candidates and Officeholders. ethics.state.tx.us
• Deandra Grant Law: The Texas State Commission on Judicial Conduct, Explained. texasdwisite.com

This post summarizes public judicial-discipline records and news reporting for general informational purposes as of publication. It is not legal advice. Judge Tennis resigned before any sanction was imposed, and nothing here implies that the Judicial Qualifications Commission’s charges were adjudicated or proven.