Gavel of Shame

Justice Anna Hantz Marconi: Disciplined as a Lawyer, Not a Judge

Deandra M. Grant
Written & Reviewed By Deandra M. Grant, JD, GC, MS, ACS-CHAL Forensic Lawyer-Scientist
Updated
Read time 27 min
The Short Answer

Anna Barbara Hantz Marconi sat on the New Hampshire Supreme Court from August 2017 until February 2026, when she turned seventy and hit the state’s mandatory retirement age. In 2024 she spoke privately with the chairman of the Pease Development Authority board and then with then-Governor Chris Sununu, who had appointed her, about the investigation into her husband, the state’s director of Ports and Harbors. A Merrimack County grand jury indicted her on seven counts. All seven were dropped, and she pleaded no contest to a separately filed Class B misdemeanor, paying a $1,200 fine. Two different disciplinary bodies examined the same conduct. The Judicial Conduct Committee charged her six months after she left the bench, settled on a stipulation in October 2026, and made no sanction recommendation at all, sending its report to the state’s highest court to decide. Eight days earlier, the Professional Conduct Committee had suspended her law license for six months, stayed for a year, on conditions including passing the ethics exam and paying the committee’s costs. Below: what she actually admitted and when, why the judicial case produced less than the bar case, and the Texas rules that would and would not reach any of it.

Justice Anna Hantz Marconi: Disciplined as a Lawyer, Not a Judge
CASE FILE AT A GLANCE
Judge Anna Barbara Hantz Marconi, Associate Justice
Court New Hampshire Supreme Court
On the Bench Nominated by Governor Chris Sununu June 6, 2017; confirmed unanimously by the Executive Council; sworn in August 8, 2017
Administrative Leave Placed on 90 days’ administrative leave by the Supreme Court on or about July 25, 2024, extended October 17, 2024
Indictment October 16, 2024, Merrimack County grand jury; two felonies and five Class A misdemeanors
Conviction All seven indicted counts were dropped October 7, 2025. She pleaded no contest to a separately filed Class B misdemeanor count of criminal solicitation of misuse of position; the court entered a finding of guilty and imposed a $1,200 fine and $288 in fees. No jail
Classified As Not a serious crime, by order of the New Hampshire Supreme Court, which restored her law license two days later
Retirement Retired February 2026 at the mandatory retirement age of seventy; succeeded by Daniel Will, confirmed February 11, 2026
Judicial Ethics Case Judicial Conduct Committee, Nos. JC-24-078-C and JC-24-079-C. Two charges under Canon 1, Rules 1.1 and 1.2. Statement of Formal Charges dated July 29, 2026; hearing set for December and later canceled
Judicial Outcome Stipulation reported October 29, 2026; admitted violation; committee made no recommendation on sanctions and referred its summary report to the New Hampshire Supreme Court
Attorney Discipline Professional Conduct Committee order of October 21, 2026: six-month license suspension, stayed one year, conditioned on passing the ethics exam, paying the committee’s costs, and no further misconduct, on an admitted violation of Rule 8.4(b)
Still Open The judicial committee’s summary report and its costs, both before the New Hampshire Supreme Court

The Conversations

Her husband, Geno Marconi, ran the state’s ports and harbors. In 2024 the attorney general’s office was investigating him over the release of confidential motor vehicle records belonging to a member of the Pease Development Authority board, the body that oversees the port. Prosecutors said the release was retaliatory. He eventually pleaded guilty and resigned.

He was placed on leave on or about April 19, 2024. That same day she left a voice message for the board chairman saying she was in need of just some basic information. He called her back, the committee found, because she was a Supreme Court justice and it would have been rude not to. He described the call as very awkward but said she was very appropriate in not crossing the line and did not ask him for anything he could not tell her.

In mid to late April, after conversations with the chief justice and the court’s legal counsel, she recused herself from every case involving the attorney general’s office. On a five-member court, one justice out of the rotation on an entire category of litigation is a real institutional problem.

On June 3 she emailed the governor’s office asking for a meeting about a personal matter involving a member of [her] immediate family. She sent it from her New Hampshire court system account, and the signature block gave her title as Associate Justice of the New Hampshire Supreme Court. The governor, the committee found, took the meeting because she was a Supreme Court justice. They met on June 6 for about ten minutes, with his legal counsel present.

She described the investigation as a big nothing arising from petty, maybe personal issues, talked about its effect on her personally and professionally, and raised the burden her recusal was placing on the court.

What the governor made of it depends on which account you read. In his interviews with investigators he was emphatic that she asked for nothing: there was no ask, there was nothing, and she was clearly not asking me to do anything. His legal counsel said the same. But the committee’s charges quote the governor describing the meeting as awkward, weird and quasi-inappropriate, though not illegal. Those are not in tension. He thought she made no request and he thought the meeting should not have happened.

Seven Counts, None of Them Convictions

She was placed on administrative leave on or about July 25, 2024. On October 16 a Merrimack County grand jury returned a seven-count indictment: two felonies and five Class A misdemeanors.

The Indictment What Happened to It
Two felonies Attempt to commit improper influence, and criminal solicitation of improper influence.
Five Class A misdemeanors Two counts of criminal solicitation of misuse of position, one count of criminal solicitation of official oppression, one count of official oppression, and one count of obstructing government administration.
What happened to them All seven were dropped on October 7, 2025, by nolle prosequi.
What she pleaded to A separately filed count of criminal solicitation of misuse of position, a Class B misdemeanor, by no contest. The factual basis was that she sought information from the governor about her husband’s investigation to which she was not entitled. The court entered a finding of guilty and imposed a $1,200 fine and $288 in fees.

She was not convicted on a count out of the seven. Every indicted count went away, including both felonies, and the conviction rests on a different charge filed for the plea. Her counsel was careful about it on the record, telling the court that the state could make an offer of proof but we’re not agreeing with those allegations.

Two days after the plea, the New Hampshire Supreme Court lifted her interim suspension and restored her law license, finding the conviction was not a ‘serious crime’ because it did not include, as a necessary element, interference with the administration of justice, false swearing, misrepresentation, fraud, deceit, bribery, extortion, misappropriation, or theft. That finding was the court’s, not a concession by prosecutors, and it is the reason she still had a license for the bar committee to suspend a year later.

The plea resolved her case and her husband’s together. Along the way she had litigated hard, seeking to disqualify the attorney general’s office from prosecuting her, and losing. She returned to the court on or about October 15, 2025. The committee says she limited herself to administrative work and did not hear arguments, deliberate or write opinions; she disputes that characterization and says she stopped sitting on cases around November 13 ahead of her retirement. She retired in February 2026 at seventy. She did not resign under pressure and she was not removed. She aged out.

What She Admitted, and When

On November 25, 2025, seven weeks after the plea, her counsel wrote to the committee acknowledging that the meeting with the governor violated Rule 1.2 because it may have created the ‘appearance of impropriety’ and could have been seen as not promoting public confidence in the independence, integrity, and impartiality of the judiciary. On January 19, 2026, under oath, she affirmed that letter, called the meeting ill advised, said she regretted her lack of judgment and took responsibility, and agreed the meeting violated Rules 1.1 and 1.2. She said the April call to the board chairman was ill advised too and should not have happened, a violation to a lesser degree.

All of that predates the formal charges by more than six months. What she kept denying was narrower and consistent: that she broke any law. Her answer to the charges admits the Rule 1.2 violation and concedes Rule 1.1 follows from it as a matter of necessity, while denying Rule 1.1 to the extent it extends to a violation of the law. Admit the appearance, deny the crime. That is the line she has held from the beginning, and it is why the two committees could look at one set of facts and do different things with it.

The Charges That Came After She Left

The committee’s case began with two complaints, both opened November 8, 2024. One started as a referral from the attorney general. The other started as a self-report filed by her own lawyer six days later. The investigation was then held in abeyance under the state’s procedural rules until the criminal case ended, and restarted on or about October 9, 2025. So the gap between the conduct and the charges is a rule, not a delay.

The Statement of Formal Charges is dated July 29, 2026 and was issued in early August, about six months after she retired. Two charges, both under Canon 1: Rule 1.1, which requires a judge to comply with the law including the Code itself, and Rule 1.2, which requires a judge to act at all times in a manner that promotes public confidence in the judiciary and to avoid impropriety and the appearance of impropriety. A three-day hearing was set for December 7 through 9, 2026 in Concord.

New Hampshire did not lose jurisdiction when she left the bench. In In re Thayer, 145 N.H. 177 (2000), another justice of that court resigned while the committee was investigating him and asked the court to stop it. The court refused: to read the rules as ending jurisdiction on resignation would run counter to the manifest purposes of New Hampshire’s system of judicial discipline. Compare Case File No. 49, where Chief Justice Gordon MacDonald’s resignation ended his case. It ended because the committee agreed it would, as a term of his stipulation, not because departure stripped the committee of power.

Her answer is worth reading for what she intended to argue. She raised the First Amendment, with real authority behind it, including Williams-Yulee v. Florida Bar, 575 U.S. 433 (2015), Republican Party of Minnesota v. White, 536 U.S. 765 (2002), and the Fifth Circuit’s Scott v. Flowers, 910 F.2d 201 (5th Cir. 1990), for the proposition that a judge does not surrender the right to speak to public officials on taking office. She intended to show that other justices and judges had met privately with the governor. And she said she had discussed the plan with the chief justice beforehand, who told her it was her right as a constituent to speak to the governor, and that she told others so at the time, well before he told investigators he could not recall the conversation.

She also made a point that nobody who saw any of this reported it. The committee heard about it from the attorney general and from her own lawyer, and not from the several court officials who knew, many of whom would have had their own obligation to report it if they thought a rule had been broken.

A Settlement With No Recommendation

On October 29, 2026, she signed a stipulation and agreement, and the December hearing was canceled. She admits a violation of the code: the 2024 conversations carried an appearance of impropriety, which is by itself enough. She continues to maintain that she broke no criminal law and sought no special treatment for her husband.

The committee made no recommendation at all, and referred its summary report to the New Hampshire Supreme Court to consider sanctions, if any. Press accounts reported it as a settlement without discipline, which is how it will probably turn out, but is not what the committee did.

The committee did say what it would have done had she still been on the bench. If the facts had shown she asked the board chairman or the governor to intervene, or that she had involved herself in the criminal investigation, it would have recommended formal discipline, up to suspension without pay or referral to the House with a recommendation of impeachment. The committee did not conclude she asked anyone to do anything.

WHAT IS STILL IN DISPUTE

The summary report. Her counsel argues it omits relevant facts, including that the governor, the board chairman and a senior official in the attorney general’s own office all said she did nothing improper; overstates the seriousness of the violation; speculates about conduct never charged; mischaracterizes her no contest plea; and leans on indictments that were dropped while ignoring the challenges she filed against them. He also says the committee initially asked her to stipulate to a summary report she had not been shown, under terms that would have required her to waive appellate rights.

The money. The committee wants her to pay the cost of its investigation. She wants it to pay its own costs and her legal bills, on the ground that the investigation only confirmed what she admitted from the start. The committee says it incurred significant expenses and has not put a figure on them.

Both go to the New Hampshire Supreme Court for review and a final decision. Which is its own problem: the court deciding what the record says about a former member of that court, and whether she has to pay for it.

The Committee That Did Impose Something

New Hampshire’s Professional Conduct Committee, which disciplines lawyers rather than judges, entered an order on October 21, 2026, suspending her law license for six months. The suspension is stayed for one year on three conditions: that she pass the Multistate Professional Responsibility Examination, that she pay the committee’s costs of investigating and prosecuting her case, and that she commit no professional misconduct during the year. She stipulated that she violated Rule of Professional Conduct 8.4(b), which makes it misconduct to commit a criminal act reflecting adversely on a lawyer’s honesty, trustworthiness or fitness.

The committee credited her cooperation, her public service, her lack of any prior discipline in more than thirty years at the bar, and the penalties she had already absorbed, which were not small: suspension from the bench, a license suspension of nearly twelve months, prosecution, conviction, fines and her own legal fees.

The body that governs her conduct as a judge produced an admitted violation and no recommendation. The body that governs her conduct as a lawyer produced a stayed suspension, an exam requirement and a bill. One set of facts, two committees, two very different results.

The court’s authority over lawyers runs through its control of admission to the bar, which is why the attorney rules carry an explicit jurisdictional statement and a rule that a lawyer under investigation cannot simply resign. Its authority over judges is the general power to superintend the courts. Both survive a departure. But the lawyer side has a license to suspend, and the judge side, once the judge is gone, has only a report.

How Texas Would Map It

THE CRIMINAL CASE MOSTLY DISAPPEARS

Texas has a statute that reads like it was written for these facts, and a definition that takes it away again. Penal Code Section 36.04 makes it an offense to privately address a representation, entreaty, argument, or other communication to a public servant who exercises official discretion in an adjudicatory proceeding with intent to influence the outcome on considerations other than those authorized by law. A private conversation with an official about a pending matter, meant to move it, is exactly the conduct described.

Then subsection (b) defines the term: an adjudicatory proceeding is any proceeding before a court or any other agency of government in which the legal rights, powers, duties, or privileges of specified parties are determined. An attorney general’s criminal investigation determines nothing. No rights are adjudicated, no party’s duties are fixed, and the governor was not exercising discretion in it at all. On the Texas text, section 36.04 probably does not reach a conversation with a governor about an open investigation, and it is a Class A misdemeanor even where it does, against a felony in New Hampshire.

Readers of Case File No. 58 will recognize the shape of that fight. There the question was whether an immigration arrest is a proceeding for purposes of a federal obstruction statute, and a judge went to prison over the answer. The word does different work in different statutes, and it is the hinge more often than the conduct is.

The bigger gap is solicitation. Four of her seven indicted counts were solicitation counts, and so was the charge she pleaded to. Penal Code Section 15.03 makes criminal solicitation an offense in Texas only where the actor intends that a capital felony or felony of the first degree be committed. Soliciting a misdemeanor, or a third-degree felony, is not a crime here at all. Misuse of position, official oppression and improper influence are nowhere near first-degree felonies, so the offense she was actually convicted of has no Texas counterpart. A Texas prosecutor would be left with party liability on a completed or attempted offense, which requires the other official to have done something.

The remaining Texas candidates do not fit well either. Section 36.03 coercion of a public servant requires coercion, and nothing in this record suggests a threat. Section 39.03 official oppression requires a public servant acting under color of office to subject someone to mistreatment or to deny a right knowing the conduct is unlawful; she was asking about her husband, not exercising power over anyone. The honest Texas answer is that most of what was charged in New Hampshire would not have been chargeable here.

THE CONDUCT RULE FITS, BUT NOT THE ONE YOU EXPECT

New Hampshire charged her with failing to avoid the appearance of impropriety, and that is the violation she admitted. The same theory would be weaker in Texas, because of where the appearance language sits. Canon 2 is titled avoiding impropriety and the appearance of impropriety, and Canon 2A provides that a judge shall comply with the law and should act at all times in a manner that promotes public confidence in the integrity and impartiality of the judiciary. The appearance half is a should, and Canon 8B(2) says a should is aspirational and not a binding rule under which a judge may be disciplined. A Texas judge cannot be sanctioned for appearances alone.

What would reach her is Canon 2B: a judge shall not lend the prestige of judicial office to advance the private interests of the judge or others. Mandatory, no qualifier. And the record the committee built is a prestige case almost to the letter. She emailed the governor’s office from her court system account with her judicial title in the signature block. The governor took the meeting because she was a justice. The board chairman returned her call because she was a justice and it would have been rude not to. Her own answer meets that head on, saying she requested the meeting and entered the governor’s office in the same manner as any member of the public, which is the right defense to make and also concedes what the question is.

This series has used that canon once before, in File 54, for a judge who walked into another judge’s robing room about a particular defendant’s sentencing. Same rule, same mechanism, different direction.

On the criminal side, Government Code Section 33.001(b)(2) folds a willful violation of the Texas penal statutes or the Code of Judicial Conduct into the constitutional removal ground, so the Canon 2B violation would carry weight even with no conviction behind it. Section 33.001(d) adds that a misdemeanor involving official misconduct includes one involving an act relating to a judicial office, which is how a misdemeanor like hers would get into the system in the first place.

TEXAS COULD NOT SEND HER THE BILL, BUT THE BAR COULD

The costs fight in New Hampshire has no Texas counterpart on the judicial side. Government Code Section 33.031 settles it before it starts: in a proceeding under chapter 33, court costs or attorney’s fees may not be awarded. Not against the judge and not against the Commission. A Texas judge in her position would have no exposure to the investigation’s cost and no claim for her own fees, and the Commission would have nothing to bargain with on that front.

That is the second New Hampshire file in this series to turn on costs. File 49’s chief justice agreed to reimburse the committee’s fees and expenses as a term of his exit. She is refusing to, and the court will decide. Two cases, one rule, and in Texas neither outcome is available.

The State Bar is a different story, and it is the part of this file that transfers. A Texas judge is also a Texas lawyer, and the two tracks run independently. Disciplinary Rule 8.04(a)(2) makes it misconduct to commit a serious crime or commit any other criminal act that reflects adversely on the lawyer’s honesty, trustworthiness or fitness as a lawyer in other respects. Rule 8.04(b) defines serious crime narrowly, as barratry, a felony involving moral turpitude, or a misdemeanor involving theft, embezzlement or fraudulent or reckless misappropriation. Her offense would not qualify, exactly as it did not in New Hampshire. But the second clause of 8.04(a)(2) does not need it to, and that is the clause her stipulation in New Hampshire rested on.

So a Texas judge who did what she did might face the Commission on one track and the State Bar on the other, and the bar track would not care that she had left the bench. Judicial office is a job you can retire from. A law license is not.

One more Texas difference, the same one File 49 flagged. A Texas judge who leaves does not close the file. Government Code Section 33.001(a)(8) defines a judge for chapter 33 purposes to include a retired or former judge, so the Commission keeps jurisdiction and the full sanction ladder stays available. Case File No. 34 shows it in practice, where a judge who resigned in May 2021 was publicly admonished in August 2025. New Hampshire works the same way. The difference is what the two systems do with it.

TWO HATS, TWO COMMITTEES

The practical lesson of this file has nothing to do with being a judge. It is that one act can be examined by more than one body, each with its own rule, its own standard and its own remedy, and that the one with the mildest-sounding jurisdiction can be the one that actually imposes something.

A criminal case asks whether the state can prove an offense beyond a reasonable doubt. A judicial conduct body asks whether the conduct undermined confidence in the judiciary, and if the judge has left, it may have nothing to impose. A bar committee asks whether the conduct reflects on fitness to practice, and it holds a license.

The classification of a conviction decides which doors stay shut. Her offense was found not to be a serious crime, which kept her license out of the automatic machinery. It did not keep her out of the ordinary machinery, and that is where she ended up.

An admission made early is still an admission. Hers came eleven months before the settlement and shaped everything after it, including the mitigation both committees credited. It did not prevent either proceeding from running its course.

How It Played in the Press

New Hampshire outlets drove this story from the indictment through the settlement: New Hampshire Public Radio, which broke the stipulation, InDepthNH, the Union Leader, the Keene Sentinel and the Boston Globe, with national pickup from NBC News and the ABA Journal at the indictment and again when she returned to the court after the plea. Local commentary took to calling the whole affair after her husband’s first name, which tells you how the two cases were understood in the state.

Nearly every account describes her as convicted, which is accurate, without noting that all seven indicted counts were dropped and the conviction rests on a different charge filed for the plea. She admitted the appearance violation in writing in November 2025 and under oath in January 2026, so the October 2026 stipulation confirmed a concession almost a year old. The third is the bar order, which landed eight days before the settlement that got the headlines and is the only thing in this entire affair that actually imposed a sanction.

Where Things Stand Now

She is retired. Her conviction stands. The judicial ethics violation is admitted and the committee has recommended nothing, leaving its summary report and its costs request before the New Hampshire Supreme Court. Her law license is suspended for six months, stayed for a year, on conditions she has to satisfy. Her husband pleaded guilty, resigned, and in June 2026 sued the state after it declined to cover his legal fees. The chief justice who, she says, told her she had every right to speak to the governor resigned in September 2026 over an unrelated matter, which is File 49.

Two things remain open: Whether the Supreme Court adopts the summary report as written, modifies it, or sends it back, because with no recommendation on the table the report is the only lasting record of what she did as a judge. And whether she is made to pay for the judicial investigation on top of the bar one, which would be impossible in Texas.

Facing the System in Texas?

A plea to a reduced charge is not a small thing, and neither is the classification attached to it. Those terms decide what a conviction costs you years later, in licensing, in employment, and in every proceeding that treats a conviction as conclusive. If you hold a professional license, ask what the plea does to it before you take it, not after.

Deandra Grant Law handles state and federal criminal defense across Texas. If you are facing a DWI or criminal charge in Dallas, Tarrant, Collin, Denton, Rockwall, or McLennan County, put our experience to work for you.

Call (214) 225-7117 • texasdwisite.com

Sources

PRIMARY SOURCES

  • New Hampshire Judicial Conduct Committee, Statement of Formal Charges, Nos. JC-24-078-C and JC-24-079-C, In re Honorable Anna Barbara Hantz Marconi, dated July 29, 2026. Source for the two complaints and their origins, the April 19 and June 3 to 6 sequence, the court-account email and signature block, the quoted accounts of the board chairman and the governor, the count structure, the nolle prosequi of all seven indicted counts, the guilty finding and sentence, the November 25, 2025 letter and the January 19, 2026 sworn statement, and the two charged rules. courts.nh.gov (pdf)
  • Answer of Anna Barbara Hantz Marconi, September 9, 2026. Source for her denials and defenses, the chief justice conversations, the First Amendment authority, the Supreme Court’s not-a-serious-crime finding and license reinstatement, her account of her return to the court, the mitigation, and the point that no one who witnessed the conduct reported it. courts.nh.gov (pdf)
  • Judicial Conduct Committee, second statement regarding Justice Hantz Marconi, February 19, 2026, for the abeyance under Supreme Court Rule 40(5)(c)(6), the October 9, 2025 restart, the dismissal of all indicted charges, and the committee’s reliance on In re Thayer for jurisdiction over a departed judge. courts.nh.gov (pdf)
  • In re Thayer, 145 N.H. 177, 761 A.2d 1052 (2000), holding that the Judicial Conduct Committee’s jurisdiction was not terminated by a justice’s resignation, and contrasting the court’s authority over lawyers with its authority over judges. courtlistener.com
  • New Hampshire Judicial Branch, Judicial Conduct Committee news page, where the charges, the answer and the committee’s statements are posted. courts.nh.gov
  • Texas Code of Judicial Conduct, as amended through June 12, 2026, Canons 2, 2A, 2B and 8B(2). txcourts.gov (pdf)
  • Tex. Penal Code Sections 36.03 (coercion of a public servant) and 36.04 (improper influence, with the definition of adjudicatory proceeding in subsection (b)). Penal Code ch. 36
  • Tex. Penal Code Section 15.03 (criminal solicitation, limited to capital and first-degree felonies). Penal Code ch. 15
  • Tex. Penal Code Section 39.03 (official oppression). Penal Code ch. 39
  • Tex. Gov’t Code Sections 33.001(a)(8), 33.001(b)(2), 33.001(d) and 33.031 (no award of costs or attorney’s fees). Texas Government Code ch. 33
  • Tex. Disciplinary Rule of Prof’l Conduct 8.04, misconduct, including 8.04(a)(2) and the definition of serious crime in 8.04(b). legalethicstexas.com

NEWS COVERAGE

  • InDepthNH, Hantz Marconi can return to the practice of law: Professional Conduct Committee (Nov. 9, 2026), for the October 21, 2026 order, the stayed six-month suspension, the three conditions, the Rule 8.4(b) stipulation and the mitigating findings. indepthnh.org
  • New Hampshire Public Radio, Retired justice settles ethics probe; won’t face discipline (Oct. 29, 2026), for the stipulation and the committee’s statement. nhpr.org
  • InDepthNH, Former Supreme Court justice still fighting ethics case (Oct. 29, 2026), for her objections to the summary report, the waiver of appellate rights and the costs dispute. indepthnh.org
  • InDepthNH, Retired Supreme Court judge accused of judicial misconduct for meetings about husband’s probe (Aug. 6, 2026), for the hearing dates and panel. indepthnh.org
  • Boston Globe, Judicial misconduct charges filed against former justice (Aug. 6, 2026). bostonglobe.com
  • New Hampshire Public Radio, Former justice hit with ethics charges (Aug. 6, 2026). nhpr.org
  • ABA Journal, New Hampshire Supreme Court justice is indicted. abajournal.com
  • Boston Globe, N.H. Supreme Court Justice Anna Barbara Hantz Marconi indicted (Oct. 16, 2024). bostonglobe.com
  • New Hampshire Public Radio, With plea deal official, Hantz Marconi ends high profile legal fight (Oct. 2025). nhpr.org
  • NBC News, New Hampshire judge accused of trying to meddle in probe of her husband returns to the bench. nbcnews.com

THE RELATED CASE

  • New Hampshire Public Radio, Geno Marconi, accused of retaliation, pleads guilty and resigns (Oct. 30, 2025). nhpr.org
  • InDepthNH, Geno Marconi pleads guilty (Oct. 31, 2025). indepthnh.org
  • New England Public Media, Former ports director sues after the state balks at covering his legal fees (June 26, 2026). nepm.org

REFERENCE

  • Texas State Commission on Judicial Conduct, how to file a complaint against a Texas judge. scjc.texas.gov
  • Deandra Grant Law, Who Polices Texas Judges? The SCJC Explained. texasdwisite.com
  • This post summarizes publicly filed judicial-conduct documents, a public criminal disposition, a reported attorney-discipline order and news reporting as of November 2026, and is not legal advice. The Judicial Conduct Committee’s Statement of Formal Charges and the former justice’s Answer were read directly and are linked above; the committee’s summary report and its stipulation and agreement were not available to us, and their contents are reported from New Hampshire coverage. The summary report has not been adopted by the New Hampshire Supreme Court and is disputed by the former justice. The Professional Conduct Committee’s October 21, 2026 order was likewise not available to us directly and is reported from coverage. Allegations in a statement of formal charges are allegations; where this file states what the committee found or alleged, it says so. Her conviction rests on a no contest plea to a single Class B misdemeanor filed separately from the indictment, on which the court entered a finding of guilty; all seven indicted counts, including both felonies, were dropped without adjudication, and nothing here should be read as a statement that those allegations were proven. Sources differ on whether she left the court on February 11 or February 12, 2026, and on whether she sat on cases after returning in October 2025; both accounts are given. Public officials who acted in their official capacities are named, including the former governor and her husband, whose guilty plea is a matter of public record; the Pease Development Authority board chairman, the board member whose records were released, and counsel are referred to by role only. The comparison of Texas law, including the readings of Penal Code sections 36.04 and 15.03, Government Code sections 33.001 and 33.031, and Disciplinary Rule 8.04, is our own analysis of the text rather than any court’s holding.
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Deandra M. Grant
Written & Reviewed By

Deandra M. Grant, JD, GC, MS, ACS-CHAL Forensic Lawyer-Scientist

She holds a Master of Science in Pharmaceutical Science and a Graduate Certificate in Forensic Toxicology, both from the University of Florida. She is the author of The Texas DWI Manual and has defended Texas DWI cases since 1994.

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