Gavel of Shame

Judge Terrence O’Connor Removed Over Refusal to Cooperate

Deandra M. Grant
Written & Reviewed By Deandra M. Grant, JD, GC, MS, ACS-CHAL Forensic Lawyer-Scientist
Updated
Read time 26 min
The Short Answer

Terrence C. O’Connor, a judge of the Civil Court of the City of New York, Queens County, was removed from office by the New York Court of Appeals on October 16, 2018. The Commission on Judicial Conduct had sustained four charges: failure to cooperate with its investigation; striking testimony and dismissing two landlord-tenant cases because counsel said okay after a witness answered; impatient and insulting remarks to lawyers in three other bench trials; and awarding counsel fees against lawyers in nine no-fault insurance cases without notice, without a hearing and without explaining the amounts. He appeared pro se, did not attend the hearing before the referee, did not appear on the two later dates the referee offered him, and did not appear at oral argument before the Commission. Two Commission members wrote separately to say that Commission counsel had conceded at argument that staff probably would not have sought removal but for the refusal to cooperate. The Court of Appeals removed him unanimously, noting that the misconduct began within a year of a prior public censure.

Judge Terrence O’Connor Removed Over Refusal to Cooperate
CASE FILE AT A GLANCE
Judge Terrence C. O’Connor
Court Civil Court of the City of New York, Queens County; elected 2009, term expiring December 31, 2018
Complaint Formal Written Complaint dated May 30, 2017; four charges; answer filed June 19, 2017
Referee Peter Bienstock, Esq., designated June 18, 2017; investigative testimony had been scheduled before referee Malvina Nathanson, Esq.
Hearing September 11 and 12, 2017, New York City; the judge did not attend
Referee Report December 14, 2017; all four charges sustained
Oral Argument February 1, 2018; the judge did not appear
Determination March 30, 2018; removal; eleven members concurring, two filing a joint concurring opinion
Rules Found Violated 22 NYCRR §§ 100.1, 100.2(A), 100.2(B), 100.3(B)(1) and 100.3(B)(3)
Court of Appeals Argued September 6, 2018; decided October 16, 2018; removal accepted without costs, 32 NY3d 121
Prior Discipline Public censure in 2013 over service as a fiduciary without required approval and omissions on the application forms
Representation Pro se throughout the formal proceeding

The Word Okay

Two cases, two different lawyers, two years apart. Both in the commercial landlord-tenant part at the Sutphin Boulevard courthouse in Queens.

September 17, 2014. An experienced lawyer for a landlord brought one witness, the property’s agent. The judge made sarcastic remarks about the witness arriving late. Before the oath was administered he yelled at the witness to stand up and asked what was the matter with him. During direct examination the lawyer said okay after an answer. The judge accused him of leading the witness, said telling a witness his answer was okay was a form of communication with your client, and warned that he would strike the testimony if it happened again. The lawyer apologized. A few minutes later, after the witness read the names on a lease, the lawyer said okay, thank you. The judge struck the testimony on his own motion, invited opposing counsel to move to dismiss, and granted the motion. Opposing counsel had never objected. The written order said the petitioner had failed to produce competent evidence. The client had to start a new case.

March 12, 2015. A different lawyer, also an experienced litigator, representing a landlord. She said okay after her witness’s answers. He told her to stop. She apologized. It happened again; he told her to stop again; she apologized again. A third time, and she explained it was a reflex. He said it was not a reflex because she did not do it all the time, warned that the next time he would strike the testimony and dismiss the case, and asked whether they understood each other. She said okay after the very next answer, caught herself and apologized immediately. He excused the witness, struck the testimony and all of her documentary evidence, and told her the testimony was stricken because she had clearly been leading the witness by telling him periodically that his answers were okay.

Then he asked whether she had other witnesses. She called one. She said okay after the first answer. He said that was once. She said it again a short time later and he struck that witness too. Opposing counsel had never objected or suggested she was leading. With no evidence left, he granted the motion to dismiss for lack of proof. Her client was under contract to sell the property and lost about ninety thousand dollars.

She described the appearance as traumatizing and wrote to the supervising judge. Supervising Judge Joseph J. Esposito testified at the Commission hearing that shortly after receiving the letter he moved O’Connor out of the commercial landlord-tenant part.

The Commission’s answer to the leading-the-witness defense was the transcripts. The word was used after answers that supplied nothing but basic information, including the witness’s occupation. Opposing counsel never objected. These were bench trials, so there was no jury to prejudice. And in the first case the judge’s repeated references to the witness’s late arrival suggested he was acting out of annoyance at the lawyer and his client. They noted: a judge should be able to distinguish between willful disregard of a judicial order and a verbal tic that is of little consequence.

Three More Trials

Charge III covered demeanor in three other bench trials, and the pattern is the same in each: the judge accusing a lawyer of discourtesy, sarcasm or unprofessionalism in terms far harsher than whatever prompted it.

January 2013. A tenant’s lawyer argued the rent due should be limited to the amount originally pleaded. The judge asked whether this was just to make money so the client would hire him again next time, called the position totally disingenuous, and said the two of them had probably a different idea of how a professional conducts themselves. Later, mistakenly believing the lawyer had rested, he said the lawyer had no idea what he was doing; when the lawyer said he did not understand a question from the bench, the judge said Apparently, there’s a lot you don’t understand.

February 2014. A landlord’s lawyer in a holdover proceeding was told she was wasting everybody’s time and was accused of sarcasm when she said thank you, Your Honor after a ruling. She said she had not meant it that way. He replied that he saw no other way to take it. Later, after she apologized for not specifying which witness she wanted to recall, he said Maybe you should do something right for a change instead of just apologizing all the time.

March 2015. A lawyer about a year out of law school appeared for a tenant and walked in as the case was called. The judge screamed at him for interrupting opposing counsel and for not having the courtesy to take off his coat. He denied the young lawyer’s motion as a delay tactic, refused a brief adjournment so his employer could come, and ordered him to trial immediately. When the lawyer held his phone in his lap to text his employer, the judge told him to put it away and asked Is there some course in law school now, how to be discourteous and how to be rude? Because if there is, you must have gotten an A in it. He then accused him of smirking and laughing and said that people like him are why people think lawyers are a disgrace. The landlord was the only witness, the young lawyer put on no evidence, and his client lost.

The Commission was blunt about the asymmetry. Quick to chastise lawyers for perceived discourtesy, the judge engaged in exactly that conduct himself, subjecting lawyers to harsh personal criticism in front of their clients and peers.

Nine Fee Awards, No Notice

Charge IV is the one that moved the case from bad temper to abuse of power.

In nine no-fault insurance cases, O’Connor granted a defense motion and then, in the same written order, directed the losing side to pay counsel fees to the defense. One order was for fifteen hundred dollars; the other eight were for two hundred fifty dollars each. Nobody had asked for fees. Nobody was told he was considering them. Nobody got a chance to be heard. And no order explained how he arrived at the amount.

New York’s rule, 22 NYCRR 130-1.1, lets a court award costs and impose sanctions for frivolous conduct on its own initiative, but subsections (a) and (d) require a reasonable opportunity to be heard first, and rule 130-1.2 requires the order to set out the reasons the court found the amount appropriate. The Commission found the amounts appear entirely arbitrary in the absence of notice, and that the parties were deprived of due process.

The Commission said in a footnote that the misconduct as to the fee awards was not as significant as the other misconduct in the record, and acknowledged that the ambiguity in his orders about whether these were costs or sanctions might best have been resolved at a hearing. There was no hearing on that question for the same reason there was no hearing on anything else: he did not come.

The Year He Would Not Appear

When What Happened
September 2016 The Commission tells him it is investigating three complaints, sends him copies and asks for a written response. He answers within two weeks.
December 2016 The Commission asks him to appear in January to testify. He writes that his lawyer is having a medical procedure and he cannot appear until the lawyer is back. The Commission postpones and asks him to identify the lawyer by December 28.
January 2017 He mails the lawyer’s name, addressed to a staff member at a telephone number and the State of New York, with the Commission’s name left off. It comes back undelivered. The Commission writes twice more, then serves him personally and sets testimony for February 15. He replies that his lawyer died on January 15 and that he will say who is taking over once an executor is appointed.
February 2017 The Commission tells him the inquiry will not be held in abeyance pending the settlement of his late lawyer’s estate, and reschedules his testimony to March 7.
March 7, 2017 He appears without counsel before a Commission referee, says he is not prepared because he has no access to the files his late lawyer may have compiled, admits he never tried to find out who at the estate’s law firm was handling them, and then refuses to take an oath or to affirm the truthfulness of the statements he had made minutes earlier. The referee adjourns to March 29 and counsel warns that non-appearance may be charged.
March 29, 2017 He does not appear. A letter arrives saying that based on the blatant lies in the staff’s most recent letter he declines the invitation to appear.
September 2017 Four days before the hearing, a lawyer contacts the referee saying he will take the case only if the hearing is adjourned three months. The referee denies it. The hearing goes ahead on September 11 and 12 without him. He later writes that he was not properly served with notice.
October and November 2017 The referee offers him a proceeding to prove the notice defect and, separately, the chance to reopen the hearing and put on his own case. He appears at neither and does not respond.

The Commission wrote: A request to appear for investigative testimony is not an invitation; the proceeding before a commission member or referee is a critical part of the Commission’s investigative powers. It found his assertion that he could not proceed without his late lawyer’s files rested entirely on speculation, noted that a client presumptively has full access to a lawyer’s file when the relationship ends, called the claim that he needed an executor first absurd, and pointed out that all of the alleged misconduct was documented in court records and audio recordings that had been handed to him anyway.

One charge the Commission declined to consider: he was alleged to have called the Commission a clown show, with an expletive attached, in front of two staff members as he left the March 7 proceeding. Given the circumstances, including that he appeared agitated and said it while stepping into an elevator, the Commission left it out of the determination.

What the Court of Appeals Held

The decision is per curiam and unanimous: Chief Judge DiFiore and Judges Rivera, Stein, Fahey, Garcia, Wilson and Feinman.

First, the rough-and-tumble defense failed. He argued his behavior was justified by the nature of landlord-tenant litigation. The Court’s answer was two words, We disagree, followed by the structure: judges must insist on order and decorum under section 100.3(B)(2), but that need must be counterbalanced against the duty of patience and courtesy under section 100.3(B)(3). Quoting a 1984 case, respect for the judiciary is better fostered by temperate conduct, not by hot-headed reactions.

Second, legal error can be misconduct. Citing Matter of Jung, 11 NY3d 365 (2008), the Court repeated that legal error and misconduct are not necessarily mutually exclusive and that a pattern of fundamental legal error may be serious misconduct. It distinguished Matter of Richter, 42 NY2d [aa] (1977), in which a judge sentenced a defendant without counsel and without notice but recognized the error the same day, vacated the sentence and resentenced properly: that error was one of sheer inadvertence and was harmless. Here the consequences went uncorrected: the petitions stayed dismissed and the fees stayed imposed.

Third, the right to be heard is not a technicality. Failing to afford litigants that right before imposing fees implicates a fundamental right, and the Court cited section 100.3(B)(6), which requires a judge to accord every person with a legal interest in a proceeding, or that person’s lawyer, the right to be heard.

Fourth, non-cooperation is an aggravator that can carry a case to removal. He argued that his courtroom conduct alone would ordinarily draw no more than censure and that his refusal to cooperate should not elevate the sanction. The Court rejected it and said why. It will not overlook the entirety of a judge’s behavior and the extent to which it qualifies in the aggregate to the level and quality of egregiousness that merits removal, quoting Matter of Roberts, 91 NY2d 93, 95 (1997). The Commission’s investigative authority comes from the constitution and the statute. And then the sentence: willingness to cooperate with the Commission’s investigations and proceedings is not only required, it is essential.

The mere existence of a prior censure would be noteworthy regardless of whether it was related to the instant misconduct, and a failure to exercise heightened vigilance within a year of discipline is persuasive evidence that the judge lacks the judgment the position requires. He had argued the 2013 censure involved dissimilar conduct, and it did. It did not help.

One line in the opinion is a direct link to File 73. Asked what makes conduct truly egregious, the Court said the inquiry is fact-specific because judicial misconduct cases are, quoting Matter of Blackburne, by their very nature, sui generis. Same county, twelve years apart, and the earlier removal supplied the standard for the later one.

The Concession in the Concurrence

The Commission’s chair and one member filed a joint concurring opinion. They wrote that speculation about why a long-tenured judge would defy the Commission ran rampant, particularly since, as Commission counsel conceded during oral argument, it is quite possible that the Commission staff would not have sought respondent’s removal were it not for his resisting the many efforts of the Commission to gain his mandated cooperation.

Commission counsel conceded that the conduct on the bench, which included destroying two clients’ cases over a verbal tic and imposing nine fee awards nobody got to argue about, probably would not have produced a removal recommendation on its own. What produced it was a year of letters.

They closed on the only ground available: if the seat is to mean anything, a judge who demanded strict adherence to procedure from everyone appearing before him must be treated with the same severity as would any litigant appearing before him who refused to cooperate with the court’s own rules.

THE DISCIPLINE LADDER (NEW YORK)

The New York State Commission on Judicial Conduct can admonish, censure, remove or retire a judge. Removal is the top rung and it is permanent: a removed judge may not hold judicial office again. A judge who loses may request review in the Court of Appeals within thirty days of receiving the determination. The Court reviews the record anew and may accept the sanction, reject it, impose a different one, or impose none at all. Removal is reserved for truly egregious circumstances and is not for conduct that amounts simply to poor judgment, or even extremely poor judgment, but that standard is measured against the fact that judges are held to a higher standard than the public at large.

A Similar Texas Case

Texas had almost exactly this case, eleven months before the Court of Appeals decided this one, and it ended five rungs lower.

On November 6, 2017, the State Commission on Judicial Conduct issued a public reprimand and order of additional education to Judge Luis Aguilar of the 243rd District Court in El Paso, under ten consolidated complaint numbers. Nine complaints had come in from the public and the Commission opened its own based on media coverage.

The conduct is the same shape. He ordered lawyers who missed hearings to show cause, held one in contempt and issued a bench warrant for his arrest after refusing to let the local counsel the order itself had authorized appear in his place. The El Paso Court of Appeals granted mandamus and voided the warrant, holding he had not given constitutionally sufficient notice of the hearing or the contempt allegations. See In re Cisneros, 487 S.W.3d 237 (Tex. App.-El Paso 2015, orig. proceeding). The Commission also found a persistent pattern of treating people with a lack of patience, dignity and courtesy, including making a prospective juror cry and shaming a sexual assault survivor who had identified herself during voir dire for supposedly trying to get out of jury duty. It concluded that the conduct violated Canons 2A, 3B(2) and 3B(4), and that it was willful and persistent conduct casting public discredit on the judiciary under article V, section 1-a(6)A of the Texas Constitution.

The result: a public reprimand, eight hours at the College for New Judges covering orientation, the role of a judge, who is in charge of the courtroom, recusal, listening, ethics and case management, and two hours of one-on-one instruction on contempt with a Commission-chosen mentor. He stayed on the bench.

Two differences explain most of the gap. He responded to every complaint in writing and appeared before the Commission to give sworn testimony on each one. And Texas’s ladder has rungs that New York’s does not.

How Texas Would Map It

THE CANONS

New York Rule Texas Counterpart
§ 100.3(B)(3) to Canon 3B(4) A judge shall be patient, dignified and courteous to litigants, jurors, witnesses, lawyers and others with whom the judge deals in an official capacity. Mandatory in both states, and the clause the Texas Commission actually charged in the El Paso case.
§ 100.3(B)(6) to Canon 3B(8) A judge shall accord to every person who has a legal interest in a proceeding, or that person’s lawyer, the right to be heard according to law. Word for word the same, and mandatory. This is the Texas hook for nine fee awards imposed without notice.
§ 100.3(B)(2) to Canon 3B(3) A judge shall require order and decorum in proceedings before the judge. Mandatory in both. This is the duty the Court of Appeals said must be counterbalanced against courtesy, not used to excuse the lack of it.
§ 100.2(A) to Canon 2A New York: a judge shall comply with the law and shall act at all times in a manner that promotes public confidence. Texas: a judge shall comply with the law and should act at all times in that manner. The public-confidence half is aspirational here.
§ 100.3(B)(1) to Canon 3B(2) New York: a judge shall be faithful to the law and maintain professional competence in it. Texas: a judge should be faithful to the law and shall maintain professional competence in it. Faithfulness is aspirational; competence is not.

Canon 8B makes that distinction binding: shall denotes obligations the violation of which can result in disciplinary action, while should states aspirational goals but not as a binding rule under which a judge may be disciplined. The Commission applies it exactly that way. In the El Paso reprimand it charged Canon 3B(2) and quoted only the competence clause, leaving the faithfulness clause alone, and charged Canon 2A and quoted only the compliance clause. A Texas commission handling this case would charge Canons 3B(4), 3B(8) and 3B(3), and would have to route the legal-error theory through competence rather than faithfulness.

THE SANCTIONS RULES

On Charge IV, Texas is stricter than New York.

Texas Rule of Civil Procedure 13 says that where a paper is signed in violation of the rule, the court, upon motion or upon its own initiative, after notice and hearing, shall impose an appropriate sanction. New York’s rule requires an opportunity to be heard; Texas, as the rule reads today, requires a hearing. Rule 13 then adds that no sanction may be imposed except for good cause, the particulars of which must be stated in the sanction order, and that courts shall presume papers are filed in good faith.

In Misc. Docket No. 26-9054 the Supreme Court of Texas gave preliminary approval to a rewritten Rule 13 and said it expected the amendments to take effect October 1, 2026. The rewrite is best known for requiring a signer to represent that the signer reviewed the filing and verified its accuracy, including that the legal citations, quotations, and holdings are not fabricated, aimed at fabricated authority from artificial intelligence. It also changes the sanctions language this comparison rests on. A court may impose sanctions after giving the signer notice and a reasonable opportunity to respond, which is New York’s standard rather than a hearing, and the order requirement becomes a written order stating the reasons for the sanction rather than good cause with its particulars. Two additions cut the other way and fit this case closely: any sanction must be proportionate to the violation found, and a court must impose lesser sanctions before striking a filing or dismissing a proceeding, or explain in the order why lesser sanctions would not do. Striking a witness and dismissing a case over the word okay would have to survive both. As of this writing the published compilation still carries the prior Rule 13 and still includes Rule 57, and we have not located a final adoption order, so the older text above is what the rules as published say.

Chapter 10 of the Civil Practice and Remedies Code runs the same requirements in parallel. Section 10.002(b) says a court acting on its own initiative enters an order describing the specific conduct and directs the alleged violator to show cause. Section 10.003 says the court shall provide a party who is the subject of a motion under section 10.002 notice of the allegations and a reasonable opportunity to respond. Section 10.004(b) limits the sanction to what is sufficient to deter repetition. Section 10.004(e) bars monetary sanctions on the court’s own initiative unless the show-cause order issues before a voluntary dismissal or settlement. And section 10.005 says the court shall describe the conduct it found violated the chapter and explain the basis for the sanction imposed.

Nine short-form orders that name no conduct, state no good cause, follow no notice and no hearing, and explain no amount would fail every one of those provisions twice over. The remedy in Texas is the one the El Paso case used: mandamus, which voided the warrant there and which is the mechanism for an order a lawyer cannot appeal from because the sanction runs against counsel rather than the client.

Section 10.006, which barred the supreme court from adopting rules in conflict with the chapter, was repealed effective December 4, 2025, by the second called session of the 89th Legislature. The notice and order provisions above are untouched.

AND THE PART TEXAS WROTE INTO THE STATUTE

Here is the difference that would make this case shorter in Texas. O’Connor’s losing argument was that non-cooperation should not lift a censure case to removal. In New York that argument failed on precedent, because the Court of Appeals has treated non-cooperation as a significant aggravating factor, citing Matter of Mason, 100 NY2d 56, 60 (2003), and because Judiciary Law section 44(3) authorizes the Commission to require the appearance of the judge involved before it. In Texas it would fail on the text.

Government Code § 33.001(b) defines the constitutional removal ground, willful or persistent conduct that is clearly inconsistent with the proper performance of a judge’s duties, and lists what it includes. Item (2) is a willful violation of the Code of Judicial Conduct. Item (5) is failure to cooperate with the commission. Not an aggravator. Not a factor in the sanction analysis. One of the enumerated instances of the ground itself.

The Commission’s tools are real too. Section 33.022(c)(2)(A) lets it order a judge to submit a written response or appear informally before it. Section 33.024 lets a commission member, special master or special court of review administer oaths, order inspection of records and issue subpoenas for attendance and testimony. Section 33.022(e) lets the Commission apply to a district court to enforce that order, and section 33.025 does the same for a subpoena and lets a special master or special court of review enforce one by contempt. One limit worth knowing: section 33.026(a) lets the Commission compel testimony over a claim of privilege against self-incrimination only as to a person other than the judge. A Texas judge who spent a year declining invitations would be looking at a subpoena, a contempt application, and a statutory removal ground with his own conduct named in it.

If a Judge Sanctions Your Lawyer Without a Hearing

Underneath the demeanor, this file is about a procedural right that gets skipped because the amounts are small. Two hundred fifty dollars is not worth a fight, which is exactly why nine of them went unchallenged. For Texas practice: a sanction imposed without notice and a hearing is vulnerable, and an order that does not state the particulars of good cause is vulnerable on its face, whether or not the underlying conduct was sanctionable. Where the sanction runs against counsel rather than the client there may be no appealable judgment in counsel’s name, which is why mandamus is the usual route. The conduct complaint and the appellate remedy are separate tracks with separate deadlines, and a complaint tolls nothing, vacates nothing and recovers nothing.

A complaint to the Texas Commission must be a completed, signed and sworn complaint form, printed and mailed to Austin. There is no fee, and the Commission does not take complaints by online form, telephone, email or fax. It handles conduct, not outcomes. For the architecture, see our explainer.

Where Things Stand Now

He was removed ten weeks before his term would have expired on December 31, 2018, and removal in New York is permanent: he may not hold judicial office again. He was sixty-nine when he argued the appeal. The same day, the Court of Appeals removed Rochester City Court Judge Leticia Astacio in a separate matter that began with her own drunk-driving conviction. See Matter of Astacio, 32 NY3d 131 (2018).

What this case left behind is the aggregation rule. A judge whose courtroom conduct would draw a censure, and whose legal errors would draw a censure, and who then declines to answer for either, can be removed for the combination even though no single piece of it would have gotten there.

Sanctioned, Held in Contempt, or Run Over in a Courtroom?

Notice and a hearing are not formalities, and an order that skips them is an order worth attacking. Deandra Grant Law handles state and federal criminal defense across Texas.

Call (214) 225-7117 • texasdwisite.com

Sources

PRIMARY SOURCES

  • Matter of O’Connor (New York State Commn. on Jud. Conduct), 32 NY3d 121, 2018 NY Slip Op 06852 (Oct. 16, 2018) (per curiam). nycourts.gov
  • New York State Commission on Judicial Conduct, Determination, In the Matter of Terrence C. O’Connor (Mar. 30, 2018), thirty-one pages plus a joint concurring opinion. determination (pdf)
  • Matter of Blackburne (State Commn. on Jud. Conduct), 7 NY3d 213 (2006), quoted in this case for the sui generis standard. See also our File 73. nycourts.gov

TEXAS AUTHORITY

  • Texas State Commission on Judicial Conduct, Public Reprimand and Order of Additional Education, Honorable Luis Aguilar, 243rd District Court, CJC Nos. 15-0984-DI et al. (Nov. 6, 2017), eleven pages. scjc.texas.gov (pdf)
  • Tex. R. Civ. P. 13 (notice and hearing; good cause with particulars stated in the order), at page 23 of the official compilation, which as of this writing still carries the prior text of the rule. txcourts.gov (pdf)
  • Supreme Court of Texas, Misc. Docket No. 26-9054 (June 26, 2026), preliminary approval of amendments to Tex. R. Civ. P. 13, including the verification representation and the rewritten sanctions provisions. txcourts.gov (pdf)
  • Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code §§ 10.002 through 10.005. Civil Practice and Remedies Code ch. 10
  • Tex. Gov’t Code §§ 33.001(b)(2) and (b)(5), 33.022(c), 33.024 and 33.025. Texas Government Code ch. 33
  • Texas Code of Judicial Conduct, Canon 2A. Canon 2
  • Texas Code of Judicial Conduct, Canons 3B(2), 3B(3), 3B(4) and 3B(8). Canon 3
  • Texas Code of Judicial Conduct, Canon 8B (the binding force of shall and should). Canon 8

NEWS COVERAGE

  • Queens Daily Eagle, Rude Queens Civil Court judge booted from bench (Oct. 16, 2018), for the courthouse, his election year and age, and the companion removal decided the same day. queenseagle.com
  • New York Daily Record, NYC judge censured (Aug. 22, 2013), for the subject matter of the prior censure. nydailyrecord.com

REFERENCE

  • Texas State Commission on Judicial Conduct, how to file a complaint. scjc.texas.gov
  • Deandra Grant Law, Who Polices Texas Judges? The SCJC Explained. texasdwisite.com
  • The findings, quotations and procedural history here are taken from the Commission’s determination of March 30, 2018, including its joint concurring opinion, and from the Court of Appeals decision of October 16, 2018. The lawyers, witnesses, litigants, Commission staff and the judge’s own counsel are referred to by role rather than by name, although the public record names them; judges, including the supervising judge and the Commission’s referees, are named. The dollar figures and the loss to one landlord are the Commission’s findings. The charge the Commission expressly declined to consider is described but not quoted. The comparison of Texas law, including the readings of Rule 13, Chapter 10 and Government Code chapter 33, and the shall and should distinction in the Texas canons, is our own analysis of the text rather than any court’s holding. The El Paso reprimand is included as a comparator on similar facts and no connection between the two judges is suggested. The statement in File 38 that this judge was the first Queens judge removed since Justice Blackburne could not be verified and has been removed from that file rather than repeated here. This post summarizes public records and news reporting as of October 30, 2026 and is not legal advice.
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Deandra M. Grant
Written & Reviewed By

Deandra M. Grant, JD, GC, MS, ACS-CHAL Forensic Lawyer-Scientist

She holds a Master of Science in Pharmaceutical Science and a Graduate Certificate in Forensic Toxicology, both from the University of Florida. She is the author of The Texas DWI Manual and has defended Texas DWI cases since 1994.

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