Justice Laura Blackburne Removed for Back Stairway Escape
On June 10, 2004, Justice Laura D. Blackburne of the Supreme Court, Queens County, was presiding over the Queens Drug Treatment Court. A detective came to arrest one of the participants on unrelated robbery and assault charges. Blackburne, believing the detective had misled the court about whether he wanted to question the man or arrest him, ordered a court officer to walk him out through a secure back corridor and stairwell reserved for judges, jurors and staff, which leads to the judges’ parking lot. The prosecutor advised against it. The court officer said twice that following the order might be obstruction of justice. She told him that if he would not do it she would do it herself. The Commission on Judicial Conduct determined on November 18, 2005, that she should be removed. Eight members voted for removal, two for censure. The Court of Appeals suspended her with pay on its own motion that December and accepted the removal on June 13, 2006, over a two-judge dissent. She was never charged with a crime. The man was arrested the next day at his program and the robbery charge was later dismissed.

| CASE FILE AT A GLANCE | |
| Judge | Laura D. Blackburne |
| Court | Supreme Court, Queens County, New York; assigned to the Queens Drug Treatment Court |
| On the Bench | Civil Court of the City of New York 1996 through 1999; Supreme Court from 2000 |
| Conduct Date | June 10, 2004 |
| Complaint | Formal Written Complaint dated August 5, 2004; one charge |
| Referee | Honorable Ernst H. Rosenberger, former Appellate Division justice; hearing November 30 and December 1, 2004; report filed August 23, 2005 |
| Rules Found Violated | 22 NYCRR §§ 100.1, 100.2(A), 100.2(C) and 100.3(B)(1) |
| Commission Vote | Eight for removal, two for censure, one member not present; determination November 18, 2005 |
| Interim Suspension | Suspended with pay on the Court of Appeals’ own motion, December 5, 2005, 6 NY3d 725 |
| Court of Appeals | Argued May 2, 2006; decided June 13, 2006; removal accepted without costs, 7 NY3d 213 |
| Dissent | Judge G.B. Smith, joined by Judge R.S. Smith, voting for censure |
| Criminal Charges | None, against her; the Commission listed three Penal Law provisions and declined to decide |
What Happened in the Treatment Court
Queens Drug Treatment Court was, and is, an alternative to prison. A defendant charged with a nonviolent felony and with a history of addiction pleads guilty, sentencing is deferred while the defendant completes treatment, and on successful completion the plea is withdrawn and the charge dismissed. Participants come back to court often so the judge can monitor them. Roughly twenty-five cases were on the calendar that morning.
At about ten o’clock a detective arrived to arrest one of the participants, a man his department believed had committed a robbery and an assault unrelated to the drug case. He told a court officer, a sergeant, that he wanted to question the man about a robbery. The sergeant understood that to mean an arrest, which is how the Court of Appeals later described it: a detective who shows up in court looking to question a defendant about a pending charge means to take him into custody. The sergeant pointed the detective to a representative of the treatment program, who told him where the man was living. The prosecutor was told. The detective then waited in the hallway outside the courtroom, because the accepted protocol was that the police not arrest a defendant at the courthouse until his case had been called.
The sergeant went to chambers and told Blackburne a detective was there to question the man about a robbery. She appears to have taken that at face value and assumed no arrest was coming. She told the sergeant to have the man’s lawyer notified and to tell the detective not to question him without counsel. Assigned counsel was unavailable, so an assigned-counsel panel attorney was brought in. He spoke to the detective in the hallway, asked whether the detective wanted the man as a subject or a witness, was told subject, and was told that yes, the detective intended to arrest him. The detective would not say on what charges.
The lawyer went back into the courtroom and told Blackburne at the bench. She told him she was going to have the man taken out of the building through a side entrance. Then she called the sergeant to the bench and ordered him to take the man out through the back stairwell at the end of the calendar call.
Two Warnings
The back area is not a public corridor. It is a secure hallway used by judges, jurors and court staff, with a stairwell running from the third floor to the first and out to the judges’ parking lot. The sergeant was, in the Commission’s word, stunned. He said nothing. He went and talked to another court officer and to the prosecutor, and asked the prosecutor whether doing what the judge had told him to do would be obstruction of justice.
He came back and told Blackburne he was uneasy and asked her to speak to the prosecutor. She did. The prosecutor told her taking the man out the back would be inappropriate, and that as a matter of policy defendants should be arrested at court rather than at their treatment programs, because participants are encouraged to feel safe at the programs. Blackburne answered that she was insulted that the detective had come into her courtroom under a ruse.
She never spoke to the detective. He was in the hallway outside the courtroom the entire time. She had two secondhand accounts, from two different people, of what he had said, concluded from the difference between them that he had deliberately deceived the court, and acted on that conclusion without checking it.
Then she put it on the record, in open court, with the detective outside the room. Speaking to the participant, she said she resented the fact that a detective came to this court under the ruse of wanting to ask questions when, in fact, he had it in his head that he wanted to arrest you. She said that if there was a basis for an arrest the detective will have to present that in the form of a warrant, that it might happen at the program, and that she was not trying to keep him from being arrested, only from being arrested today in my courtroom.
When the proceeding ended the sergeant approached her a second time, said again that he felt uneasy, and said he was concerned her direction amounted to obstruction of justice. She interrupted him, started to stand up at the bench, and told him he had been given an instruction, and that if he did not take the man out the back exit she would do it herself. He said he would do it. He said later that he decided it had to be him rather than her, so as not to compromise her safety or that of the other judges.
He walked the man out the side doorway, through the secure hallway and down the stairwell to the parking lot, then went to the security office, told his captain, and filed an unusual occurrence report. When the detective realized what had happened he went out the front door and could not find him. The man was arrested the next day at the treatment center. Bail was set at fifty thousand dollars. The robbery and assault charges were eventually dismissed.
The complaint that started the case was filed the following day by the Patrolmen’s Benevolent Association.
The Crimes Nobody Charged
The Commission wrote that it did not need to decide whether her conduct was unlawful, and then named the three statutes it was not deciding about: Penal Law § 195.00, official misconduct; § 195.05, obstructing governmental administration; and § 205.50, hindering prosecution. Its reason for naming them was that behavior that even raises such questions is inconsistent with the role of a judge.
No prosecutor ever charged her. The court officer who raised the obstruction question twice turned out to have been raising a question the disciplinary body itself thought was open, and the answer was never given by anyone with the power to give it. Keep that in mind at the end of this file, because it is the hinge of the comparison.
Removal, and the Argument Against It
She conceded the impropriety. Her entire case was about sanction, and her argument was a survey: she catalogued every single-incident removal in the Commission’s and the Court’s history, showed that each one involved venality, corruption, moral turpitude, a breach of trust or personal gain, and argued that a single act of bad judgment outside those categories cannot support removal.
The Court of Appeals answered that in two sentences that have been quoted in judicial discipline cases ever since. Judicial misconduct cases are, it said, by their very nature, sui generis, and it had never implied that removal is limited to the categories of case that had previously come before it. Then it turned her unprecedented-sanction argument around: Petitioner’s conduct was unprecedented. We know of no instance in which a judge has facilitated the escape of an accused violent felon.
The comparator it did use was Matter of Gibbons, 98 NY2d 448 (2002), where a town justice signed a search warrant and then telephoned the target company’s lawyer to tell him the search was coming. Gibbons had been removed even though the referee found he may have acted out of anger at the company rather than any wish to impede the warrant. In both cases, the Court said, the judge jeopardized the very legal system he was duty-bound to protect and administer.
It also rejected the premise that this was one unconsidered act. She had at least two chances to reconsider, from the sergeant and from the prosecutor, and used neither. She refused to take seriously the court officer’s concern that he would be committing a crime. And releasing a suspected violent felon onto the street, the Court said, potentially posed a danger to the public: Things might easily have turned out otherwise. That the man went back to his program, and that the charge was later dismissed, in no way redounds to petitioner’s credit.
By interposing herself between the defendant and the detective she placed herself above the law she was sworn to administer, abandoned her role as neutral arbiter, and became an adversary of the police.
The Dissent Kept a Ledger
Two judges dissented and would have censured. Their opinion is mostly a reprint of the two dissenting Commission members, and between them they assembled something no majority opinion in this area has ever bothered to assemble: a complete list of the single-incident cases, sorted by what the judge had done.
| Category | The Cases |
| Removed, with venality or a breach of trust | Bribe solicited; racial epithets threatening Black New Yorkers if they appeared in the judge’s court; attempted ticket fixing for a son by a judge with prior discipline; an ex parte promise to a political leader to adjourn a case, plus lying to the FBI; false subscriptions on designating petitions; sexual assault; solicitation of sexual favors; a slur against Jewish people in a letter on court stationery; convictions for abuse of an incompetent person and for sexual relations with a person with a mental disability; a court check issued to pay a judgment after mishandling the case; and a judge who left for a job in Iraq. |
| Censured, for conduct the dissent called worse | A judge who released a murder defendant into his own custody and took her home overnight. A judge who knowingly issued an illegal order and fabricated a conviction so a defendant could be deported. A judge who held an acquitted, unrepresented defendant in an isolation cell for days and then altered his contempt order to hide the basis for it, and who separately jailed a litigant’s father for an expletive in a parking lot. |
| Censured on review | A town justice who arranged a friend’s arraignment with no prosecutor available and then dismissed the case, and who jailed an eighteen-year-old who came back fifty dollars short of the restitution he had been ordered to bring, without telling him he had a right to a lawyer. The Commission voted to remove; the Court of Appeals substituted censure. |
The dissent’s question was simple: what makes frustrating a lawful arrest worse than facilitating an illegal deportation? The majority’s only answer to the strongest of those comparisons was a footnote: the Commission’s determination in that case was never appealed to the Court, so the Court had never passed on it and did not need to say whether it was wrongly decided.
The dissent also had the mitigation. She had an unblemished disciplinary record across a decade on the bench, had continued serving without incident for the two years between the conduct and the determination, had admitted within hours that she was wrong, and was about two years from retirement. Commission counsel conceded at oral argument that she was unlikely to do it again. Seven witnesses testified for her. Four were judges: Milton Mollen, former Presiding Justice of the Appellate Division, Second Department; former Appellate Division Justices John Carro and Seymour Boyers; and Appellate Division Justice Steven Fisher, who had given her the Treatment Court assignment in the first place and who urged her retention anyway. A sitting member of Congress, a former mayor of New York City and a former state senator also testified. Six bar associations and judicial organizations filed on her behalf. None of it mattered.
One Commission member, concurring in removal, wrote the sentence that holds both sides at once: she had been a role model for women of color, and she had been genuinely trying to protect someone she believed needed protecting, and in doing so she stopped being a judge and became the defendant’s advocate.
| THE DISCIPLINE LADDER (NEW YORK)
The New York State Commission on Judicial Conduct can admonish, censure, remove or retire a judge. There is no suspension on the ladder as a sanction. Removal is the top rung and it is permanent: a removed judge is ineligible to hold judicial office again. A judge who loses at the Commission may request review in the Court of Appeals within thirty days of receiving the determination, which reviews the record anew and may accept the sanction, reject it, impose a different one, or impose none. The Court may also suspend the judge with pay on its own motion while the review is pending, which is what it did here in December 2005 and what it has done twice more in this series, in File 45 and File 46. |
Three Courthouses, Three Endings
The same problem has now produced three files in this series, across twenty-one years, and no two of them ended the same way.
| Case | What the Forum Did |
| 2004, Queens, New York | Blackburne orders a drug-treatment participant out a secure back stairwell to defeat a lawful arrest by a city detective on a state robbery charge. No criminal charge is ever brought against her. The Commission names three crimes and declines to decide. She is removed, permanently, on a single episode. |
| 2018, Newton, Massachusetts | A district court judge is accused of letting a defendant leave through a courthouse back door to avoid a federal immigration officer. She is indicted. The federal charges are dropped. The Supreme Judicial Court publicly reprimands her and expressly finds that she did not know of or authorize the exit through the back door. She returns to the bench. See File 48. |
| 2025, Milwaukee, Wisconsin | A circuit judge directs a man out a jury door while immigration agents wait in the public hallway. She is indicted, convicted on one count and acquitted on the other, resigns, and is appealing. No judicial conduct proceeding has ever been brought against her. See File 58. |
The only one of the three who was never prosecuted is the only one who lost her career. The one who was criminally charged for the same courthouse maneuver kept her seat, because a disciplinary body with subpoena power held a hearing, made findings and concluded she had not done the thing. And the one who was actually convicted has never faced a conduct proceeding at all.
Blackburne obstructed a city detective making an arrest on a state robbery charge. The other two cases involved civil immigration arrests on administrative warrants, which is why the obstruction question in File 58 turned on whether an immigration arrest is a proceeding at all. Nobody had to ask that question here.
How Texas Would Map It
Two of the four rules she was found to have violated have a weaker Texas twin, and the criminal exposure runs the other way.
THE CANONS
Section 100.2(A) of the New York rules says a judge shall respect and comply with the law and shall act at all times in a manner that promotes public confidence in the integrity and impartiality of the judiciary. Texas Canon 2A splits that sentence: a judge shall comply with the law and should act at all times in a manner that promotes public confidence. Section 100.3(B)(1) says a judge shall be faithful to the law and maintain professional competence in it. Texas Canon 3B(2) says a judge should be faithful to the law and shall maintain professional competence in it.
Canon 8B says shall denotes binding obligations the violation of which can result in disciplinary action, and should relates to aspirational goals but not as a binding rule under which a judge may be disciplined. The Texas Commission reads it that way in practice. In the Texas reprimand discussed in File 74, the Commission charged Canon 3B(2) and quoted only the competence clause, not the faithfulness clause.
So a Texas commission facing these facts would be left with Canon 2A’s compliance clause and with the constitutional ground itself, article V § 1-a(6)A, willful or persistent conduct that casts public discredit upon the judiciary or the administration of justice. Government Code § 33.001(b)(2) puts a willful violation of the Texas penal statutes inside that definition, which is why the criminal analysis below is not academic.
THE CRIMINAL STATUTES
New York’s Commission named its three. Texas has closer fits, and one of them is a felony.
| Provision | How It Would Apply |
| Penal Code § 38.05(a)(2) | Hindering apprehension or prosecution. A person commits an offense if, with intent to hinder the arrest of another for an offense, he provides or aids in providing the other with any means of avoiding arrest or effecting escape. A secure stairwell and a uniformed escort are means. The statutory defense in subsection (b) covers only warnings under subsection (a)(3), so it does not reach this conduct. |
| Grade | Class A misdemeanor, rising to a third-degree felony under subsection (d) if the person helped is under arrest for, charged with, or convicted of a felony and the actor knew it. A drug-court participant who has pleaded guilty to a felony with sentencing deferred is at least arguably within that language, which would make the same afternoon a felony in Texas. |
| Penal Code § 38.15 | Interference with public duties. Criminally negligent interference with a peace officer performing a duty or exercising authority imposed or granted by law. Class B misdemeanor. The speech-only defense in subsection (d) would not cover ordering an escort. |
| Penal Code § 39.02(a)(2) | Abuse of official capacity. Misuse of government property, services or personnel with intent to obtain a benefit or to harm or defraud another. The Penal Code defines a benefit to include an advantage to anyone whose welfare the actor is interested in, which fits a judge protecting a participant better than intent to harm does. She used a court officer and a restricted court corridor. The grade turns on the value of the use, which here would be small, so this is the least of the three. |
| Penal Code § 39.03(a)(2) | Official oppression. Intentionally impeding another in the exercise of a right, privilege, power or immunity, knowing the conduct is unlawful. The knowledge element is the obstacle, and it is the reason the two warnings from the court officer would be the State’s best evidence. |
AND THE TWIST
Every one of those provisions assumes the detective was entitled to make the arrest. In New York he plainly was. Criminal Procedure Law § 140.10(1)(b) lets a police officer arrest for a crime whenever he has reasonable cause to believe the person committed it, whether in his or her presence or otherwise. No warrant, no exigency, no presence requirement.
Texas has no such provision. A warrantless arrest here has to fit one of the narrow categories in Chapter 14 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. Article 14.01 requires the offense to be committed in the officer’s presence or view. Article 14.03(a)(1) requires a suspicious place. Article 14.04 requires satisfactory proof, on a credible person’s representation, that a felony has been committed and that the offender is about to escape, so that there is no time to procure a warrant. A detective walking into a courtroom to arrest a man on a robbery his department investigated days earlier, with the man appearing voluntarily on a court calendar, fits none of them.
Which means that in Texas, the judge’s instruction from the bench would have been correct on the law. If there is a basis for him arresting you, he will have to present that in the form of a warrant is a statement of New York law that is wrong and a statement of Texas law that is close to right. The hindering statute does not require the arrest to be lawful, so section 38.05 might still reach the escort. But section 38.15 requires the officer to be exercising authority imposed or granted by law, and section 39.03 requires the judge to know her own conduct is unlawful.
Where Things Stand Now
Removal in New York is permanent. A removed judge is barred from holding judicial office again, and Blackburne never returned to the bench. She was roughly two years from retirement when it happened, and the sanction cost her the office, the title and the pension-eligible years she would have served.
What has outlasted her is the sentence about sui generis. It became the Court of Appeals’ standard answer to any judge who argues that his conduct does not match an earlier case. The same phrase turns up in the Wisconsin suspension in File 47.
| Charged After Something Went Wrong in a Courtroom?
Hindering apprehension, interference with public duties and official oppression are real charges with real defenses, and the first question is almost always whether the officer had the authority he says he had. Deandra Grant Law handles state and federal criminal defense across Texas. Call (214) 225-7117 • texasdwisite.com |
Sources
PRIMARY SOURCES
- Matter of Blackburne (State Commn. on Jud. Conduct), 7 NY3d 213, 2006 NY Slip Op 04748 (June 13, 2006) (per curiam; G.B. Smith, J., dissenting, R.S. Smith, J., concurring in the dissent). nycourts.gov
- Matter of Blackburne, 6 NY3d 725, 2005 NY Slip Op 09216 (Dec. 5, 2005) (suspension with pay on the Court’s own motion pending review). nycourts.gov
- New York State Commission on Judicial Conduct, Determination of Removal, In the Matter of Laura D. Blackburne (Nov. 18, 2005), twenty-seven pages with a concurring opinion and two dissenting opinions. determination (pdf)
- New York State Commission on Judicial Conduct, case page for the determination. cjc.ny.gov
TEXAS AUTHORITY
- Tex. Penal Code §§ 38.05 (hindering apprehension or prosecution) and 38.15 (interference with public duties). Penal Code ch. 38
- Tex. Penal Code §§ 39.02 (abuse of official capacity) and 39.03 (official oppression). Penal Code ch. 39
- Tex. Code Crim. Proc. arts. 14.01 through 14.05 (arrest without warrant). Code of Criminal Procedure ch. 14
- Texas Code of Judicial Conduct, Canon 2A. Canon 2
- Texas Code of Judicial Conduct, Canon 3B(2). Canon 3
- Texas Code of Judicial Conduct, Canon 8B (the binding force of shall and should). Canon 8
- Tex. Gov’t Code § 33.001(b) (what willful or persistent conduct includes). Texas Government Code
COMPARATIVE AUTHORITY
- N.Y. Crim. Proc. Law § 140.10 (arrest without a warrant by a police officer). nysenate.gov
REFERENCE
- Texas State Commission on Judicial Conduct, how to file a complaint. scjc.texas.gov
- Deandra Grant Law, Who Polices Texas Judges? The SCJC Explained. texasdwisite.com
- The findings, quotations and procedural history here are taken from the Commission’s determination of November 18, 2005 and from the Court of Appeals opinions of December 5, 2005 and June 13, 2006. The treatment-court participant, the detective, the court officer, the prosecutor, the assigned-counsel panel attorney, the program representative and the character witnesses who were not judges are referred to by role rather than by name, although the public record names them; the quoted passage from the transcript has had names removed for the same reason. The participant’s robbery and assault charges were dismissed and he was never convicted of them. The list of single-incident cases is the dissenting opinions’ own categorization, summarized here by category rather than by case name. The comparison of Texas law, including the readings of Penal Code sections 38.05, 38.15, 39.02 and 39.03, of Chapter 14 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, and of the shall and should distinction in the Texas canons, is our own analysis of the statutory text and not any court’s holding; no Texas judge has been prosecuted or disciplined on facts like these so far as we can find. This post summarizes public records as of October 30, 2026 and is not legal advice.
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