From No Contest to Not Guilty

Case File at a Glance

The Original DUI Matter

The procedural history of this case begins earlier in 2026, when Judge Ludington was arrested in Michigan on a state-court allegation of driving under the influence. The arrest was first reported in the press by The Detroit News, which obtained the underlying records from Michigan state law-enforcement sources. The original criminal proceeding occurred in Michigan state court under Michigan state law.

Judge Ludington ultimately resolved the original matter by entering a plea of no contest to a lesser misdemeanor charge. A plea of no contest (sometimes called nolo contendere) is not an admission of guilt for purposes of civil liability, but, for purposes of the criminal case, it produces the same outcome as a guilty plea: the defendant accepts the criminal punishment without contesting the State’s allegations. The court entered judgment accordingly. The sentence included a term of probation with conditions, among them required drug and alcohol testing.

Judge Ludington has been on paid leave from the federal bench since around the time of the original disposition. Press reporting attributes the paid-leave status to the federal judiciary’s internal response to the criminal matter, but the specifics of any internal action have not been publicly disclosed.

The New Probation-Violation Allegation

On June 8, 2026, Michigan authorities arraigned Judge Ludington on a new allegation: that he had failed to undergo the drug and alcohol testing that was a required condition of his probation. The new matter is a probation-violation proceeding in Michigan state court, separate from but procedurally connected to the original DUI disposition.

Judge Ludington pleaded not guilty to the new allegation. Through his defense counsel, Jonathan Steffy, Judge Ludington said in a written statement that he “is making every effort at compliance with all court orders.” The probation-violation matter is now pending. As with any unresolved allegation, the firm follows its standing practice and treats the alleged conduct for what it is: an allegation. Judge Ludington is presumed innocent of the probation-violation allegation in the same way any probationer is presumed innocent of an alleged violation.

If the probation-violation allegation is sustained, the consequences typically available to a Michigan state court in a probation-violation proceeding include extension of probation, modification of conditions, jail time within the statutory range for the underlying offense, or some combination. The exact range depends on the underlying conviction. Probation-violation proceedings are not full criminal trials; the State’s burden is generally lower (preponderance of the evidence in most jurisdictions), and many of the procedural protections that attach to a charged criminal offense apply in modified form.

What “Paid Leave” Means for a Federal Judge

“Paid leave” is not a defined category in the federal judicial-discipline rules. It is an administrative arrangement, sometimes voluntary, sometimes negotiated, by which a sitting Article III judge temporarily ceases to hear cases while continuing to draw the salary the Constitution guarantees for the duration of the appointment. Article III, Section 1 of the Constitution provides that federal judges “shall hold their Offices during good Behaviour” and that their compensation “shall not be diminished during their Continuance in Office.” That salary protection is the structural feature that distinguishes “paid leave” for a federal judge from any analogous concept in the private sector.

What paid leave does not do is remove the judge from the bench. Until and unless one of three things happens a sitting Article III judge remains in office: voluntary resignation, retirement (including senior status, which is a partial reduction of caseload rather than a removal), or impeachment by the United States House of Representatives and conviction by the United States Senate. The judicial council of the relevant circuit can request voluntary retirement; it cannot compel removal. That is, by constitutional design, the exclusive province of Congress.

The implication for this case is that Judge Ludington’s status (paid leave, no public judicial-council action, criminal proceedings ongoing in state court) is, structurally, an interim posture. It is not, on its own, the end of anything.

The Limits of the Public Record at This Stage

More than any prior file in this series, this file is written from an incomplete public record. The original DUI plea is a matter of state-court record, but the specifics of the plea, sentence, and probation conditions have been reported in summary form rather than in detail. The federal judiciary’s internal response to the criminal matter has not been publicly disclosed beyond the fact of paid leave. The new probation-violation allegation, having been filed only on June 8, 2026, has not yet been developed in any pretrial record.

This series’ usual practice is to base case files on adjudicated public records (ex. SCJC orders in Texas, judicial-council orders in federal matters, or the orders of state judicial-discipline bodies). The Ludington matter, as of this file, does not yet have that kind of record. What it has is a sequence of public events: an arrest, a no-contest plea, paid leave, and a probation-violation arraignment. That is enough to open the file. It is not yet enough to draw definitive conclusions.

The Takeaway

Three observations close out this file.

First, the proceeding before the Michigan state court next is a probation-violation proceeding, not a new criminal trial. Whatever a reader thinks about the public spectacle of a federal judge sitting at a probation-violation table, the legal stakes are bounded: the probation-violation court is not retrying the DUI; it is asking whether Judge Ludington complied with the conditions a court has already imposed on him.

Second, the constitutional architecture limits what the federal judiciary can do here. The Eastern District of Michigan and the Sixth Circuit Judicial Council have the authority, under the Judicial Conduct and Disability Act, to investigate misconduct and impose internal sanctions up to recommending impeachment to Congress. They do not have authority to remove Judge Ludington from the federal bench. That decision, if it is to be made at all, belongs to Congress.

Third, the case is a reminder of something that runs throughout this series: judges have the same exposure to the criminal process as everyone else. A judge who is a probationer is, in the probation-violation court, a probationer first and a judge second. A judge who has been arrested for DUI is, in the moment of the arrest, a driver. The dignity of the office is not, and was never designed to be, immunity from the law that the office exists to apply.

The Gavel of Shame  •  National Edition  •  Case File No. 18

By Deandra Grant  •  Deandra Grant Law  •  Published June 10, 2026

Sources

Carrie Johnson, “Three judges, three scandals and new scrutiny of judicial accountability,” NPR / Houston Public Media (June 9, 2026). houstonpublicmedia.org

Judicial Conduct and Disability Act of 1980, 28 U.S.C. §§ 351–364. law.cornell.edu

U.S. Constitution, Article III, Section 1 (good-behaviour tenure; compensation protection). constitution.congress.gov

This post summarizes a publicly disclosed Michigan state-court probation-violation arraignment and the prior public record of the underlying criminal matter. The probation-violation allegation is unresolved; allegation voice is used throughout. The presumption of innocence applies. The internal response of the federal judiciary to either the underlying matter or the probation-violation allegation has not been publicly disclosed beyond the fact of paid leave. This is general commentary on a public record, not legal advice.